Misunderstanding Financial Crises

《Misunderstanding Financial Crises》是2012年出版草句特的图书，由Gorton, Gary B.编写。

• 中文名 Misunderstanding Financial Crises
• 页    数 240
• 出版时间 2012-11
• 作    者 Gorton, Gary B.

书籍信息

书籍基本信息

　来自　定价:$ 33.84

内三胜操侵雨容简介

　　Prior to th础假本晚草名复低着黄补e financial crisi频玉结千回选季奏零s of 2007-2008, economists thought that no suc360百科h crisis could or would ever happen again in the Uni良副约周场子酒振四上ted States, that financial events of such magnitude were a thing o前衣龙宁企f the distant past. In fact, observers of that distant past--the period from the half century prior to the Civil War up to the passage of deposit insurance during th培鸡预调听吸互防e Great Depression, whic混压劳径义h was marked 论令挥它容洲部正支by repeated fina石价但井屋双东激希贵ncial crises--note that while legislation immediately after crises reacted to their effects钱景今教料船刻院粉理, economists and policymakers continually failed to grasp the true lessons to be learned. Gary Gorton, considered by many to be the authority on the financial crisis of our time, ho验刑手向画喜买普功宗愿lds that economists fundam流推排丰跑草厂entally misunderstand financial crises--what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. 方织乙between 1934 and 2007. In Misunderstanding Financial Crises, he illustrates that financial crises are inherent to the production of bank debt, which is used to conduct transactions, and that unless the government designs intelligent regulation, crises will continue. Economists, 减稳火算重宽响钢鲁永战he writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was impor剂委木娘务含tant: the evolution of capital markets a治nd the banking system, the existence of new financial ins我牛致truments呼武期证粮色露程六果需, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Delving into how such a massive intellectual failure could have happened, Gorton offers a back-to-basics elucidation of financial crises, and shows how they are not rare, idiosyncratic, unfortunate events caused by a coincidence of unconnected factors. By looking back to the " from 1934 to 2007 when there were no systemic crises, and to the " he brings together such issues as bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, and moral hazard and too-big-too-fail, to illustrate the costs of bank failure and the true causes of financial crises. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in large part to economists' misunderstandings. He then looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to conceive of markets, as well as a description of the regulation necessary to address the historical threat of financial crises.

作者信息及目录

作者简介

　　Gary B. Gorton is the Frederick Frank Class of 1954 Professor of Finance at the Yale School of Management. He is the author of Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007.

目录信息

　　Preface

　　I. Introduction

　　II. Creating the Quiet Period

　　III. Financial Crises

　　IV. Liquidity and Secrets

　　V. Credit Booms and Manias

　　VI. The Timing of Crises

　　VII. Economic Theory without History

　　VIII. Debt During Crises

　　IX. The Quiet Period and Its End

　　X. Moral Hazard and Too-Big-To-Fail

　　XI. Bank Capital

　　XII. Fat Cats, Crisis Costs, and the Paradox of Financial Crises

　　XIII. The Panic of 2007-2008

　　XIV. The Theory and Practice of Seeing

　　Bibliographic Notes

　　Notes

　　References

　　Index